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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2708 
I . ' 
,. 
BERNARD B. BAILEY, Appellant, 
versus · 
J. A. Ai~DERSON, STATE HIGH""\iV AY COMMISSIONER, 
DEP ... IBTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, COMMON;. 
WiEALTH OF VIRGINIA, STATE OFFICE BUILD-
. ING, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, Appellee. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Jitdges of the Sitpreme Court of Appeals . 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner represents that he is aggrieved by a final. 
decr~e of the Circuit Court for Fairfax County, Virginia, 
entered on the 25th day of November, 1942, sustaining a (Je-
murrer to the bill of complaint in a certain suit in Equity 
therein pending·, which was brought by the petitioner against 
the above .named defendant. 
A transcript of the record is presented ~erewith. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
This is a suit in equity filed hy complainant for an injunc-
tion a~:ainst the construction of a hhrhway through the com-
plainant's nronerty and for a decree declaring that the statute 
under which the defendant has taken the complainant's nron-. 
. erty is invalid in that it deprives the c.omplainant. of his 
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property without due process of law, contrary to the Con-
stitution of the State of Virginia and the 14th amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. 
2* *The cause was heard, by the lower court, on the bill 
of complaint and exhibits therewith filed, and demurrer 
:filed by the defendant. · . 
The facts alleged in the bill of complaint and admitted by 
the demurrer to be true are as follows: 
The complainant owns a brick grist mill in Fairfax County, 
Virginia (built in 17H4), in which stone buhrs are operated 
by an overshot wheel, which receives its power from wateJ.? 
that flows through complainant's mill race, which runs in a 
winding course at the foot of a hill and connects with a stream 
known as "Colvin run". The mill has been operating con-
tiirnously except for brief intervals due to drought, repairs, 
sickness, and other unavoidable causes, for nearly a century 
and a half, grinding grain for customers for toll as required 
by the Vfrginia statutes, and manufacturing water grouud 
corn meal, whole wheat flour, and other products commonly 
manufactmed in water mills, serving the needs of the public 
and enjoying the privileges and water rights accorded to it 
under the laws of Virginia. Because of a drought existing 
at the time the bill was filed, the mill was not operating con-
tinuously, but ,the bill alleges that the mill can and will re-
sume operations when the stream is replenish~d by rains. It 
is essential that the mill race be kept freG-from ·obstructions 
in order to get the flow of water necessary to operate the mill 
wheel, and in order to prevent the water from running over 
and breaking the banks of the race during heavy rains. · 
State Hig·lnvay No. 7, which is in front of the mill, runs in 
a vertical curve up a hill near the mill and then curves on 
3• *level gromid. In August, 1941, the State Highway De-
partment had plans to improve the highway by lightening 
up this cm·vnt.ure and lo,vering· the topography of the hill, 
and forwarded the plans to the District Office of the Depart-
ment at Culpeper. 
At the instance and request of owners of property on the 
hig·hway, the District. road officials in September, 1941, caused 
a survey to be made for a re-location of the highway on a 
course running through complainant's mill property behind 
the mill, through the mill race, and cutting a deep gorge 
through the hill adjacent to the race. Plaris based on· this 
survey were approved ort .September 15, 1941, by the Chief 
Em.dneer of the State Highway Department. 
The plans approved 011 September 15, 1941, called for the 
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laying of cement pipe in the mill race under the highway, 
runmng bet,veen 90 and 100 feet in a bend corresponaing to· 
the existing course of the race. It will be exceedingly difncult 
if not impossible to keep the pipe free from obstructions and 
to maintain a sufficient flow of water through the pipe to op-
erate the mill, and during heavy rain storms it will be impos-
sible to remove obstructions from the pipe and the water 
will back up and cut through the race bank and cause wash-
outs which will stop the operation of the mill and will be 
exceedingly expensive and difficult to repair. These injuries 
to the race will be recurring injuries and beyond the power 
of the complainant to prevent, and will cause a complete 
breakdown of the race and a permanent stoppage of the op-
eration of the mill by water power. 
In September and October, 1941, complainant presented to 
the State and District ~·oad officials his objections to the 
4* *re-location of the highway throug·h his mill race, ex-
plained to them the injuries to the mill race and the 
serious interference with the operation of the ~ill, and re-
quested them to make a survey and prepare a plat to show 
what could be done to avoid these injuries by lightening up 
the curvature of the existing· road. The State and District 
road officials refused to grant this request, treated lightly 
the complainant's contentions, and without fmther investi-
gation, tiled a certificate of deposit with the Circuit Clerk 
of Fairfax County, notified the complainant, entered his mill 
property, and proceeded with steam shovel and other equip-
ment to construct the hi.gh way through the mill race, acting 
pursuant to Sections 1969j ( 4) and 1969j ( 6·) of the Virginia 
Code . 
.An acceptable highway, suitable for modern heavy traffic, 
can be constructed without affecting the. complainant's mill 
race and mill by following generally the center of the exist-
ing l1ighway in front of complainant's mill and by lightening 
up the curvature of the existing highway and lowering the 
topography on the vertical curve, as planned originally by 
the State Highway Department and as delineated by a plat 
prepared by the County Surveyor of Fairfax County and filed 
with the bill of complaint. 
The complainant prayed in his bill that he be awarded a 
permanent injunction enjoining and restraining the def end-
ant from constructing the highways over the land and through 
the mill race of the complainant and requiring the defendant 
to restore the complainant's land as far as possible to its 
former condition, and for such other and complete relief as 
the nature of his case may require and as to equity may seem 
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meet; and that the statute pursuant to which the def end-
-5* ant took complainant's property be *declared unconsti-
tutional as depriving complainant of his property with-
out due process of law in that the time allowed the defendant 
by the statute for instituting condemnation proceedings is 
unreasonable. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. 
As grounds of error, appellant avers that the Court, in 
sustaining the defendant's demurrer and in entering the de-
cree of November 25, 1942, failed to observe the following 
principles of law: 
1. Equity has power to restrain the unauthorized or the 
arbitrary acts of the State Highway Commissioner. 
2. In exercising the power of eminent domain, the State 
Highway Commissioner cannot legally destroy or materially 
impair the operation of a property devoted to a public use un-
less this authority is granted expressly or by necessary im-
plication. 
3. A grist mill is a property devoted to a public use. 
4. The authority of the State Highway .Commissioner to 
condemn property for highway purposes is expressed in gen-
eral terms, and he has no express authority to destroy or ma-
terially impair the operation of a grist mill. 
5. The State Highway Commissioner does not have im-
plied authority to destroy or materially impair the operation 
of a grist mill where an acceptable improvement can be ac-
complished on the existing highway without affecting· the op-
eration of the mill. 
6. The statute ( Sections 1969j ( 4) and 1969j( 6), Virginia 
Code) allowing the defendant to postpone the commencement 
of condemnation proceedings for a period of time be-
6* ginning with the entry ,:~on the property and ending sixty 
clays after completion of the highway is unreasonable and 
unconstitutional. 
7. Complainant has the right to challenge the validity of 
the statute since the defendant has elected to invoke. the 
statute in taking· complainant's property. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED. 
Does the Court have the power to restrain the arbitrary, 
unauthorized acts of the State Highway Commissioner? 
Does the State Highway Commissioner have the authority 
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to condemn appellant's mill property so as to destroy or 
materially impair the operation of the mill 1 
.Are the allegations in the bill of complaint sufficient to 
show arbitrary or unauthorized acts of tbe State Highway 
Commissioner t 
Is the statutory procedure for condemning property sixty 
days after completion of the highway constitutional, and are 
the allegations in the bill sufficient to enable the complain-
ant. to challeng·e the validity of the procedure f ,,. 
.ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S 
POSITION. 
1. Judicial Review of the Action of the State. Highway 
Com,-missioner. 
The appellant does not dispute the rule that· the decision 
of the State Highway Commissioner as to the necessity for 
condemning property for highway purposes is not subject to 
judicial review (Prichard v. State Highway Com·missioner, 
167 Va. 219), but the appellant contends that this rule is based 
on the assumption that in determining such necessity the 
7* Commissioner acted in accordance *with statutory au-
thority and made an accurate investigation of all rele-
vant facts; and the appellant contends that the Court should 
restrain the unauthorized or arbitrary acts of the Commis-
sioner. (So. Ry. Co. v. Com., 159 Va. 779, 290 U. S. 190.) 
In determining whether the State Highway Commissioner 
abused his discretion, the test is whether he gave full and fair 
consideration to all of the relevant facts (Mitrvhy v. Uhl, 159 
Md. 7, 149 A. 566; Tippett v. Gates, 223 S. W., Texas, 702; 
Cheatham Co. v. flaker, 161 Tenn. 222, 30. S. W. (2) 234; 
State v. Sitperior Court of Washington for Yakinia Co., 128 
Wash. 79, 222 P. 208). 
. The decisions cited lay down the rule that where the Hig·b-
way Department has fully investigated and considered all 
of the relevant facts, the Court will not interfere with the· 
decision of the Department, but that if it is alleged that the 
Highway officials refused to examine and consider fairly and 
carefully all of the facts before selectinQ.' a particular route 
the Court will review the decision of the Highway Department 
and all of the facts which should have been considered. If 
this were not the rule, tben the Highway Department would 
virtually be above the law and beyond the reach of the Court 
and the "Ion~ arm'' of equity would not be able to stay the 
hand of the Commissioner (Bo. Rt/, Co. v. Com., supra). 
6 Supreme Court of . Appeals of Virg~ia 
The appellant contends further that the Court should re-
strain the acts of the State Highway Commissioner that are 
not in accordance with his statutory authority (State High-
way Com. v. Kreger, 128 Va. 203), and that the appellant 
may show any facts tending to prove that the exercise of the 
power of emment domain 1s unauthorized (Light v. City of 
Danville, 168 Va. 181). Obviously tp.e State Hig·hway 
' 8* Commissioner is not the sole judge of *whether he is au-
thorized by statute to condemn a particular property. 
Whether he is authorized or not is for the Court to decide 
( W assenich v. City <t Co. of Deni·er, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 
533; Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Section 440). 
2. .Authority of State Highway Commissioner to Condemn 
Pro pertv D<~voted to a .Piiblic Use. 
The power· of eminent domain cannot be exercised so as to 
destroy or materially in1pair the operation of a property de.:-
voted to a. public use, unless the authority to do so is ex-
pressly gTanted or necessarily implied (Richmond, F. ~ P. 
R. Co. v. Johnston, 103 Va. 456; Northern, Central R. Co. v .. 
Mayor ct City Council of Baltimore, 123 Md. 658, 106 A. 159). 
Administrative agencies and officers of the State, including 
local highway authorities and the State Highway Qom.mis-
sioner, are subject to this rule. fo. Kansas City So. R. Co. 
v. Sevier Co., 286 S. W. (Ark.) 1035, the Court said that it 
would be an abuse of discretion to unnecessarily cross rail-
road yards with highways when it could be avoided by a 
deviation in :the highway. In Central Light db Power Co. v. 
Willa-cy Co., 14 S. vV. (2) (Tenn.) 102, the Court ordered an 
inquiry to ascertain whether there was some other practicable 
way in which the highway could be improved without impair-
ing a public service property. In Williamson Co. v. Frank-
lin 8. H. Turnpike Co., 143 Tenn. 628, 228 S. W. 714, the 
statute expre~sly authorized the taking of the turnpike for 
highway purposes, and the Court approved the taking be-
cause of the statutory authority. The Court applied the rule 
to the State Hig·hway Department and stated that ''where 
property has been dedicated to a public use, it cannot be 
taken for another and inconsistent use, unless the power 
9* so to take it is conferred expressly *or by necessary im-
plic.ation. "' In Miss. State High. Corn. v. Yellow Creek 
Drainage District, 180 S. (Miss.) 7 49, the Court affirmed a 
decree of a lower court enjoining the State Highway Com-
mission from interfering with the drainage system of a drain-
age district on the ground that the drainage district was de-
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voted to a public use and there was no authority, either ex-
pressed or implied, for the State Highway Commission to 
interfere with the drainage system. It was shown that the 
State Highway Commission persisted in interfering with the 
drainage system althoug-h the Drainage Commissioners in-
formed the· State Highway Commission of the interference 
and used every m~ans in their power to persuade the State 
Highway Commission not to interfere with the drainage, 
system. 
3. Public Character of G1·ist Mills. 
A grist mill is devoted to a public use, and comes within 
the rule that the operation of a property devoted to a public 
use cannot be destroyed or materially impaired by the ex-
ercise of the power of eminent domain unless the power is 
granted in express terms or by necessary implication. 
The public character of a grist mill in Virginia is set forth 
in the case of Crenshaw v. Slate Rfoer Co., 6 Rand. 245, where 
the Court s_aid that "In proof of this, various laws. may be 
cited ; such as those regulating their tolls, their weights, and 
measures, that they shall grind the grist in due turn, etc.'' 
A history of the Virginia statutes regulating grist mills is 
shown in the case of Varner v.·Martin, 21 "'\V. Va. 534. This 
decision has been cited with approval in Fallsburg Power d!; 
Manf.cJ. Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98; Dice v. Sherman, 
10* 107 Va. 424; and in Bovd *v. (!. L. Ritter Lumber Co., 
119 Va. 348, where the Court in considering· a Vermont 
statute stated that it was different from the Virginia statute 
'' in that while the owner of a grist mill was required to grind 
well and sufficiently all grain received, at certain fixed rates 
of toll, such owner was not compelled to receive grain for 
grinding· against llis will''. In Lewis on Eminent Domain, 
3rd Ed., Section 278, it is stated that grist mills ''whicl1 are 
re.g-ulated bv law and obliged to serve the public are undoubt~ 
edly a public use", citing· Varner v. llfartin. . 
The present statute of Virginia (Va. Code 1942, Sections -
3594 and 3594a) imposes upon mills the fixed and definite 
duty of grinding· for the public at a fixed charge and provides 
a penalty for fajlure to perform this public use. The statute 
was amended in 1932 by the addition of a much strong·e·r pro-
vision, giving· to the State Corporation Commission the power 
to hear complaints against mills and to rep;ulate the prac.., 
tices of mills and tq fix rates of toll to be charged, thus placing 
mills directly under the control of the State Cornoration 
Commission ·which '' is the instrumentality through which the 
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State exercises its governmental powers for the regulation 
and control of public service corporations'' {Jeter v. Vinton-
Roanoke Water Go., 114 Va. 769). · 
The public character of a property is not lost by a tem-
porary inability to operate full time. In Vt. Hydroelectric 
Gorp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 112 A. 223, 12 A. L. R. 1495, the 
test laid down by the Court was not what ~vas actually being 
done with the property at the time, but what the prospect 
was for devoting the property to a public use, the test 
11 • being whether the owner *" in good faith * * * intends to 
use the property for such purpose without unreason-
able delay'', and these are ''largely questions of fact to be 
inferred from circumstances under which the property is 
held''. A similar test was applied in East Bay Mitnic. Utility 
District v. City of Lodi, 8 P. (2) (Calif.) 532, and City of 
Norton v. Lowden., 84 F. (2) 663. 
Applying· this principle to the allegations of the complain-
ant's bill, it is evident that there is nothing in the bill to 
justify the conclusion that the operation of the mill is con-
tingent or problematical, or that it will not be operated in 
the near future. The bill alleges that because of a prolonged 
drought the mill is not in continuous operation, but can and 
will resume operation as · soon as the stream is replenished 
by rains. Obviously the mill does not lose its public char-
acter because of a drought. The bill alleges the intention 
and the ability of the complainant to operate the mill for 
the use of the public, and the time for the resumption of con-
tinuous operation depends upon the condition that is beyond 
the control of complainant. 
4. Lack of Express Authority o.f State Ilighway Gom1nission 
to Destroy or M ateriallY' Impair the Opera-
tion of a Grist Mill. 
Authority to condemn, exprei:,sed in. general terms, is not 
sufficient to establish express authority to destroy or ma-
terially impair the operation of a property devoted to a 
public use. The authority, to be express, must be granted 
definitely and unmistakably. In Lewis on Eminent Domain, 
3rd Ed.,. Section 440, the author states: '' Authority given 
in general terms, the ref ore, is not suffi~ient to authqrize the 
taking for an inconsistent purpose, of property already 
12* devoted to a public use and necessary for the .*p'-iupose 
to which it is devoted.'' In Richmond F. ·<t P. R. Co. v. 
Johnston, 103 Va. 456, the Court sa~d that "A ·general 
power of condemnation * * $ is insufficient to authorize the 
condemnation'' of certain railroad properties, and the Court 
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stated that while the power to condemn such property is 
recognized '' the authorities seem uniformly to hold that it 
must be exercised in obedience to a statute which specifically 
authorizes its condemnation, and that general language * * * 
is insufficient to that end.'' 
Illustrations of statutory provisions expressly authorizing 
condemnation of properties affected with a public use are 
as follows: The statute involved in Crem;haw v. Slate River 
Co., 6 Rand. 245, expressly authorized the construction of 
mill dams if locks were not built, etc. In the opinion of J uclge 
Green, it is stated (at pages 283) that the Legislature had an 
undoubted right to abridge or modify the rights of mill ·own-
ers in their dams '' either by Special Acts, in each particular 
case, or by some general provision and regulation''. In re-
ferring to "some general provision and regulation", the 
Court undoubtedly meant to refer to a provision expressly 
applicable to all mill dams in general rather than specifically 
applicable to a particular mill. The statute was not directed 
· at any particular mill but included all mills along· the river, 
and in that respect the statute was a '' general provision and 
regulation", that is, an express provision relating to mills 
as a general class. An illustration of a provision expressly 
applicable to a general· class of property is found in Matter 
of Mayor, etc., of New York, 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 
where the statute authorized the taking of "all wharf prop-
erty'' and the property condemned was held to be 
13* within the *class of property to which the statute spe-
cifically refers. A similar stah,te is found in the case 
of fVilliamsfJn Co. v. Ji'ranklin S. ll .. Titrnpike Co., .143 Tenn. 
62$, 228 S. W. 714, where the highway officials were author-
ized to condemn "any turnpike or turnpikes in said county''. 
Other i1Iustrations are the provisions authorizing: the con-
demnation of damg for draina~e nurposes (Va. Code 1942. 
Section 1747), provisions authorizing- the condemnation of 
properties of public service corporations After a hearirnr be-
fore tl1e State Oornoration Commission (Ibid .. Section 3832). 
provisions authorizing the condemnation of lands of a uni-
versity or an incornoratecl collea-e, or other seminarv of lear11-
in~ .not owned and conducted bv the Commonwealth ( Ibid., 
Rection 4384 ), :md the nrovisions authorizinsr the condemna-
tion of cClmeteries ( Ibid., Sections 54. 5n. 4388 ( 42)). 
No such express power is !riven the State Highwav Com-
missioner to conclemn and destrov or materil:1 llv impaii· the 
nneratinn of mills. The power of eminent domain of thP, 
State Hi2·hwav Commi~sioner is expressed in: Section J9fi9j(l) 
of the Virginia Code 1942, in general terms only, as follows: 
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"The State Highway Commissioner ((I * ii is hereby vested 
with the power of eminent domain insofar as may be neces-
sary for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, mainte-
nance and repair of the public highways of the State, and 
for these purposes and all other purposes incidental thereto, 
may condemn property in fee simple and rights of way of 
such width and on such routes and grades and locations as 
by said Commission may be deemed requisite and suitable, 
including locations for permanent, temporary, flcon-
14«< tinuous or periodical use.'' 
Since the statute quoted above does not contain any ex-
press provision authorizing the condemnation of mill prop-
erty devoted to a public use, the authority must be estab-
lished, if at all, by necessary jmplication. 
5. Lack of Implied Authority of Sta.te Highway Commissioner 
to Destroy or Materially Impair the Operation 
of the Complainant's Mill. 
Where the power of e:ninent domain is granted in general 
terms, and an attempt is made to condemn by destroying or 
materially impairing the operation of a property devoted to 
a public use, the burden is on the party exercising the power 
to prove that the authority to condemn is granted by neces-
sary implication. In Lewis on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.), 
Section 440, the author states that where the power of emi-
nent domain is given in general terms "the p·resumption is 
ag·ainst the right to take property which is already devoted 
to public use. This presumption ·may be overcome by show-
ing a reasonable necessity for the property desired as com-
pared with its necessity and importance to the use to which 
it is already devoted". In Vermont Hydroelectric Corp. v. 
Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 112 A. 223, the Court laid down the rule 
as follows: "It should' also be noticed that where the lan-
guage of the statute conferring the right of eminent domain 
is general it is presumed, in the absence of some necessary 
implication to the contrary, that it was not intended that land 
already devoted to one public use should be taken for another. 
* * * As the defendants rely upon the claim of legislative au-
thority conferred by necessary implication; theirs is the bur-
den of establishing it. * $. • ' ' 
15* *In Inhabitants o.f Springfield v. Conn. R. R. Co., ·4 
Cush. (Mass.) 63, where a railroad company sought to 
condemn a highway the Court said that "If, to the minds of 
reasonable men, conversant with · the subject, another line 
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could have been adopted between the termini, without taking 
the highway, reasonably sufficient to accommodate all the 
interests concerned, and to accomplish the objects for which 
the grant was made, then there was no such necessity as to 
warrant the presumption that the legislature intended to au-
thorize the taking of the hig·hway' ' . 
.Applying these principles in the case of highway construc-
tion, if the authority to destroy or materially impair the op-
eration of the property devoted to a public use is not ex-
pressly granted by the statute but is asserted on the basis 
of necessary implication, the highway of.ticials have the bur-
den of establishing· the authority by showing that the high-
way cannot be reasonably improved without destroying or 
materially impairing the operation of the property. If it ap-
pears that an acceptable highway can be reasonably con-
structed without interferhig with the operation of the prop-
erty devoted to a public use, then the authority to destroy 
or maMrially impair such property cannot be established. 
Cases in which the highway authorities failed to establish 
the authority to destroy or materially impair the property 
because it appeared that they had other reasonable means of 
constructing an acceptable highway are as follows : 
In Miss. St. High. Cont. v. Yellow Creek Drainage Dist., 
180 S. (Miss.) 749, the State Highway Commission was en-
joined from constructing a bridge in a manner that 
16* would materially impair '~the operation of a drainag·e 
system. In Bpard of Co·m.'·rs. for Clarendon Co. v. Hol-
laday, 182 S. C. 510, 189 S. E. 885, the Highway authoritie~ 
were denied the right to take ce~mete'ry property although the 
highway officials had carefully examined an alternative route 
and construction of the hig·hway on the alternative route ne-
cessitated two curv cs in the high,,1ay. In State v. 811,perfor 
Court of TifTashington for Yaki1na Co., 128 Wash. 79, 222 P. 
208, the highway authorities were denied the right to impair 
the operation of a cold storage plant because there was an 
alternative route, even though it appeared that the alterna-
tive route would result in a slight curvature in the highway. 
In Central Power and Li,qht Co. v. Willacy, 14 S. W. (2) 
(Tex.) 102, where in widenin~ a high'Yay the property devoted 
to a public use was materially impaired, the highway au-
thorities failed to establish by necessary implication that the 
improvement could not be accomplished without damaging 
such property. The court said that ''there was no effort to 
establish • • * that there was no other practical way by which 
the obiect of the condemnation proceedings could be accom-
plished.'' 
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The bill of complaint alleges that an acceptable highway, 
suitable for modern, heavy, through traffic, can be constructed 
by following generally the center of the existing highway in 
front of the appellant's mill and. by lightening up the· curva-
ture of the existing highway and lowering the topography 
on the vertical curves, and that such improvement would not 
interfere with the operation of the mill, and could be accom-
plished at reasonable cost, etc. 1U pon proof of these allega-
tions the defendant would not be able to establish by 
17* necessary implication that he has the '"'authority to de-
stroy or materially impair the operation of the appel-
lant's mill because he would fail to show that the highway 
could not be reasonably improved without causing such de-
struction or impairment. 
6. Constitutionality of Sta-titte .Allowing the State Highway 
Commissioner a Period of Sixty Days After Con.,i-
pleting a Highway in Which to Institute 
Condemnation Proceedings. 
The appellant does not dispute the principle that property 
may be taken by eminent domain before the proceedings are 
instituted to ascertain just compensation. The appellant con-
tends that in order to coinply with due process, the statute 
authorizing property to be taken prior to proceedings must 
provide for the institution of proceedings within a reason-
able time after the property is taken ( Bragg v. Weaver, 251 
U. S. 57, 40 S. Ct. 62, 64 L. Ed. 135), and it is believed that 
this principle is not disputed by the appellee. 
The statute under which the appellee took the appellant's 
property, without instituting proceedings, provides that the 
State Highway Commissioners may take property for the 
construction of a highway, and that "vVithin sixty days after 
the completion of tha construction of such highway * * * the 
said Commissioner shall institute condemnation proceed-
ings", but the statute does not provide any means by which 
the property owner may institute. proceedings on his own 
motion (Va. Code 1942, Section 1969j ( 4)). The appellant 
contends that this statute does not provide for the institution 
of proceedings within a reasonable time after the property 
has been taken (lJ1cG-ibson v. Roane Co. Court, 95 W. Va._ 338, 
· 121 S. E. 99; Simms v. Dillon, 193 S. E. (W. Va.) 331), 
18* and this is *disputed by the appellee. 
In Bragg v. Wea1;er (si1rpra), the .Court upheld the 
Virgini~ statute aut11orizing the road official to take earth 
for road purposes prior to proceeding·s. The statute author-
ized proceeding·s to be instituted by either the road official 
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or the owner. The statute allowed the road official to bring 
the action without limiting the time, but it gave the owner 
the right to institute proceedings at any time and thus pre-
vent the road official from de1aying the proceedings. 'rhe 
Court said: '' Thus the . owner is free to act promptly and 
upon his own motion, if he chooses.'' In other words, where 
the statute permits an unreasonable time in which the high-
way official may bring the action the statute is valid if it 
provides that the owner also may bring an action freely and 
promptly on his own motion. 'l1he test of the invalidity of 
the statute is whether it allows the highway official an un-
reasonable time in which to bring the action without author-
izing the owner to bring an action upon his own motion. 
Applying this test to a West Virginia statute, which au-
thorized the County Court to . enter upon any lands and lo-
cate and build a road, '' and sixty days after said road is 
completed'' to cause the damages and benefits to be assessed 
by viewers, without authorizing the o,vner to bring action, 
the Court in McGibson v. Roane Co. Gou.rt (sitpra) declared 
the statute unconstitutional. The Court said that the owner 
must not be put to unreasonable delay, and that ''It is essen-
tial, however, that the remedy be one to which the party 
can resort on his own motion; if the provisions be such that 
only the public authorities appropriating· the land *are 
19* authorized to take proceedings for the assessment, it 
· must be held to be void.'' ( Quoting from Cooley's Const. 
Lim., 7th Ed., p. 815). Continuing, the Court said: '' Tested 
by these principles, where does the land owner stand under 
the provisions of the statute? The county court may enter 
on his land, deprive him of possession, and it· is not required 
to take a single step toward even ascertaining the amount 
of the compensatton to be paid until sixty days after the work 
is completed. The work might be delayed for years; so that 
the time in which payment is to be made might be delayed 
for a like period. Again, the owner is given no right to initi-
ate proceeding·s. He is not authorized to resort to the remedy 
provided by the statute; that is given to _the court alone. For 
these reasons we hold these statutes invalid.'' 
In a later case (8i1Jn1ns v. Dillo1z, 193 S. E. 331), the ·west 
Virginia court, commenting on the vVest Vii;ginia statute 
held invalid in McGibson v. Roane Cou,nty Court (supra), 
said: '' One of the reasons this Act was held unconstitu-
tional was because it did uot provide for the payment of the 
compensation due the land owner within a reasonable time 
after the taking· of the land and therefore allowed property 
to be taken without due process of law. * * * The McGibson 
case held, also, that the Act in question in that case was un-
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constitutional because it did not provide for the payment 
with.in a reasonable time of the compensation due the land 
owner. The reasoning of the court was that an unlimited 
time might, under the provisions of that Act, elapse before 
the compensation might be due: The Act there did not pro-
vide tllat a reasonable time for the completion of the work 
should be allowed, but provided that the proceedings 
20* could be instituted withm *sixty days after the com-
pletion of the work. Of course, under such statute, the 
state might take its own time and permit years to elapse be-
fore the compensation due would be payable.'' 
Since the vv est Virginia statute is the same in meaning as 
the Virginia statute, the latter also should be declared un-
constitutional 01,1 the same grounds, i. e., that it allows the 
State Highway Commissioner to postpone the proceedings 
for an unreasonable time and does not allow the owner to 
bring action freely ·and promptly on his own motion. 
In arguing these points in the lower1 court, the appellee at-
tempted to distinguish the two statutes by stating that the 
West Virginia statute compelled the highway authorities to 
wait until sixty days after completion of the road while the 
Virginia statue aithorizes the State Highway Commissioner to 
wait that long. The appellant contends that the two statutes 
are not distinguishable. The West Virginia statute stated 
'' sixty days'' after completion and the Virginia statutes 
state "'\Vithin sixty days" after completion, so that the ap-
pellee 's contention rests on the proposition that by not using 
the word "within" the vVest Virginia statute co1npelled the 
highway authorities to wait until sixty days after comple-
tion of the roaa before bringing action. If this were the 
meaning of the statute the result would be that if the high-
way authorities desired to bring action sooner and the owner 
had no objection, still the action could not be brought under 
the statute. There would be no point in having a statute 
that prevents the bringing of the action when both the high-
way authorities and the owner desire it be brought, and it is 
illogical to suppose that by omitting the word ''within" 
21 • the West Virginia *Leg·islature intended to enact a 
meaning-less inhibition. There is no indication in the 
decision of the West Virginia court that tbe statute was held 
invalid· because it comvP.lled the road officials to wait. On 
the contrary, the court (McGibson v. Roane Co. Ct., su,pra), 
said that the county court was '' not required'' to take action 
until sixty days after completion of the road, meaning by 
this expression that the county court was authorized to take 
action earlier; and in Sim11is v. Dillon ( s11,pra), the court used 
the words "within sixty days'' in referring to the statute. 
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But assuming for the sake .of argument that the West Vir-
ginia statute compelled the delay, still it is not sound to argue 
that a delay is reasonable under a statute that authorizes the 
delay but unreasonable under a statute that compels the de-
lay. Whether the statute is unreasonable is to be tested by 
the time which the road official is authorized to take. . So 
the question whether the West Virginia statute compelled 
the delay is immaterial. · 
In the court below the appellce, following a similar line 
of argument, stated that the practice of the State Highway 
Commissioner was to bring the action before sixty days after 
completion, apparently arguing that for this reason the stat-
ute should be upheld. But the answ~r is that it is not what 
the State Highway Commissioner has · done, is doing, or in-
tends to do under the statute, but rather what he is author-
ized to do thereunder, that bears on the validity of the stat-
ute. (City of Richmond v. Carneal, 129 Va. 388.) 
Then the. appellee contended that the statute should be 
upheld because it does not authorize the State Highway Com-
missioner to delay the construction of the road arbi-. 
22* trarily. The *statute would, of course, be nefarious if 
it authorized the Commissioner to delay the construc-
tion of the road intentionally, but the fact that the statute 
does not authorize ~rbitrary delay in the construction of the 
road is no. ground for saying that the statute does not au-
thorize an ~nreasonable delay in the ascertainment and pay-
ment of compensation. Primarily the delay in construction 
would be due to difficulties which the Commissioner could not 
prevent, such as difficult construction work, weather condi-
tions, war, etc. The statute makes no distinction between con-
struction requiring an extended time and con~truction re-
quiring a short time. The Commissioner 4as si~ty days after 
completion of construction in which to bring action, regard-
less of the time required to complete the construction. . In 
McGibson v. Roane ·coutnty Coir,rt, the Court said: "The 
work might be delayed for years; so that the time in which 
payment is to be made might be delayed for a like period.'' 
rhe matter of arbitrary delay was not mentioned by the 
Court. The main point was that the delay might deprive 
the owner of compensation for an unreasonable time. The 
extent of the delay authorized, arid not the cause of the delay, 
is, therefore, the determining factor in testing the validity 
of the· statute. 
The appellee contended further that the statute should be 
upheld by construing it to mean that if the construction of 
the road is delayed for an unreasonable time the Commis-
sioner must institute proceeding·s within a reasonable time 
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and cannot wait until sixty days after completion of the 
. road. This argument is made in the face of the explicit 
23* languag·e of the statute, viz., *"Within sixty days after 
the completion of the construction of such highway. 
*" * * '' The appellee 's contention cannot be sustained with-
out ig11oring these words of the statute, the effect of which 
woufd be to "convict the lawmakers of enacting a meaning-
less provision of the .Act". (Ya. Electric <t Power Go. v. 
Place, 150 Va. 562.) The West Virginia statute was not con-
strued in this manner. After the ·west Virginia statute was 
held invalid (McGibson v. Roane Co. Gt., supra), the West 
Virginia Legislature substituted another statute in which the 
provision allowing sixty days was omitted and the hig·hway 
official was required to bring action after the lapse of a rea-
sonable time for the construction of the road (Sininis v. Dil-
lon, supra). The appellee is seeking· to liave the Court carve 
out of the Virginia statute the provision for sixty days after 
completion, whereas in West Virginia the Court refused to 
perform this operation, leaving it for th~ Legislature to do. 
In advancing· these contentions the appellee is seeking the 
support of rules that apply when the statute uses general 
language or is ambiguous, such as the rule that the Court will 
construe a statute so as to uphold it. Where the language is 
specific and unambig11ous this rule has no application, and 
the Court will not introduce other provisions. ''The inten-
tion of the Legislature is to be obtained primarily from the 
language used in the statute. The court must impartially 
and without bias review· the written words of the Act. * * * 
Where the language of a statute is plain and. unambi~ous, 
there is no occasion for construction, even though other mean-
ings could be found, and the court cannot indulge in 
24*· speculation as to the probable or possible *qualifica-
tions which might have been in the mind of the Legis-
lature, but the statute must be given effect according to it~ 
plain and obvious meaning and cannot be extended beyond 
it because of some supposed policy of the law.'' 59 Corpus 
Juris, pp. 952-957; Kain v . .Ashworth, 119 Va. 605; Fairbanks-
Morse & Go. v. Cape Cha.rles, 144 Va. 56; Chandler v. Pen. 
F. dJ P. Co., 152 Va. 903; Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924; Han-
cock Co., Inc., v . .Stephens, 177 Va. 349; Town of South Hill 
v. Allen, 177 Va. 154. 
The words of the statute, "within sixty days after the com-
pletion of the construction of such highway'' are neither gen-· 
eral nor ambiguous, and there is no room for construing these 
words so as to reduce the time allowed the State Highway 
Commissioner for bringing the action. The Court would not 
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be justified in construing the statute to read: "Within sixty 
days after the completion of the construction of such high-
way, or in case the completion is delayed for an unreason-
able time then within a reasonable time for completion of such 
highway, the said Commissioner shall institute condemnati9n 
proceedings.'' To uphold the statute by this means would 
be introducing· a new provision rather than construing an 
ambig·uous provision. 
Finally the defendant contends that the plaintiff has relief 
by mandamus, but the defendant does not deny that before 
the Commissioner may be compelled by mandamus to insti-
tute a condemnation proceeding, it must be shown that the 
Commissioner is under duty to bring the action. Wilson v. 
State Highway Commissioner, 174 Va. 82. Under the statute 
in question the Commissioner is not under ,duty to bring the 
action until sixty days after the completion of_ the high-
25* way, and, therefore, the *plaintiff cannot maintain man-
damus until that time has elapsed. If it be said that 
mandamus will lie to compel the defendant to complete the 
·highway, still the plaintiff would have to wait until sixty 
days after completion of the highway before mandamus 
would lie to compel the defendant to bring· action. Moreover, 
where it is impossible for the highway to be completed in a 
reasonable time because of some unforeseen contingency be-
yond the control of the Commissioner, mandamus would not 
lie even to compel him to complete the road because he would 
not be under duty to do the impossible. In that event the 
Commissioner would not be under duty either to complete 
the road or to bring action to condemn, and the property 
owner would have no relief on his own motion until sixty days 
after completion, which, as the court said in M cGibson v. 
Roane County Court (supra), '' might be delayed for years; 
. so that the time in which payment is to be made might be de-
layed for a like period". · 
7. Right of Coniplain.ant to Challenge the Validity of the 
Statute. 
In challenging .the statute the appellant does not eontend 
that at the t"ime, the bill of eomplaint wa.s filed the appellec 
had waited an unreneonable time. The statute is invalid 
whether the appellee had waited an unreasonable time or not. 
The bill of complaint shows that the appellant is directly af-
fected by the invalid statute. It alleges that the appellee has 
taken. the appellant's property by authority of the statute, 
and by reading the statute it becomes evident that the statute 
has touched the appellant by depriving him of the power to 
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institute or to compel the appellee to institute condemnation 
proceedings within a reasonable time. The appellant's right 
to institute or to compel the appellee to institute pi'o-
26,¥; ceedings without delay was ,,taken away at the time the 
bill was filed just as effectively as if the appellee at that 
time had already taken an unreasonable time to complete the 
highway. 
CONCLUSION. 
Summarizing· the legal principles for which the appellant 
contends, it is submitted that upon the c.omplaint of a dam-
aged property owner, it is the duty of the court to restrain 
the State Hig·bway Commissioner in the construction of a 
hig·hway (1) when he acts arbitrarily in relocating· the high-
way without carefully examining and considering all possible 
means of improving the highway, or (2) when the Commis-
sioner, even after considering all possible means of improv~ 
ing the highway, exceeds his statutory authority to condemn, 
expressed in general terms, by destroying or materially im.., 
pairing· the operation of a property that is devoted to a pub-
lic use when the Commissioner lms available to him another 
feasible and acceptable means of improying the highway that 
would not affect the operation of such property. It is sub-
mitted that under the Virginia statutes a grist mill is devoted 
to a public us<.1 and that the State Highway Commissioner 
does not have specific authority to destroy or materially im-
pair the operation of a g~·ist mill, but that such authority can 
only be implied from a sl1owing by the Commissioner that 
there is no other feasible and acceptable means of improving 
the highway without destroying or mat.erially impairing the 
operation of such property. 
It is submitted, therefore, that t11e allegations of the bill 
of complaint. are sufficient. to justify the issua~ce of an in-
junction restrainirn>· the appellee. from c.onstruc.ting the 
27" bi,g-hway •on appellant's property in the manner al-
le~red (a) becau~e of tl1e allep:ecl arbitrary acts of the 
appellee 's agent in refusin!!: to examine and comdder fairly 
and ~arefullv all of the relevant facts which slwuld have been 
weighed before the decision was made to relocate the high-
wav. (b) because it is alle~ed that the construction of the 
relocated highway will deRfroy or materially impair the Op-
era ti on of appellant's mill which is devoted to a public use, 
and ( c) because it is allep.:ed that tl1e existing highway can. 
be reasonablv imnroYed for the proper accommodation of 
modern traffic without relocatinQ' the highway and without 
causing any damage to the operation of the mill. 
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It is submitted that the Virginia statute mentioned herein, 
under which appellant's property was taken, is in violation 
of the due process clause of the 14th Amend. to the Const. 
of the U. S. and Sec. 11 of the Vir~inia Constitution; and ap-
pellant contends ths.t in the taking of his property under the 
statute and in the arbitrary apd unauthorized manner men-
tioned herein, the appellee has deprived the appellant of his 
property without due process of law contrary to said due 
proce8s clauses of the 14th Amend. to the Collst. of the U. S. 
and Sec. 11 of the Virginia Constitution. 
Finally, it is submitted that the appellant has the right to 
challenge the constjtutionality of the statute because (a} his 
property has been taken by authority of the statute, (b) he 
has been subjected to the appellee's power, under the statute, 
to delay the bringing of condemnation proceedings until sixty 
days after the compietion of the highway, and ( c) the .statute 
has completely stripped him of all power to institute 
2s• proc.eedings on his *own motion, or to compel the ap-
pellee to institute proceedings within a reasonable time. -
Petitioner, therefore, respectfully petitions. the Court (1) 
to g-rant this appeal, (2) to reverse the decree of the lower 
Court, (3) to declare that the statute (Va. Code, 1942, Secs. 
1969j(4) and 1969j (6) ), under which the petitioner's prop-
erty ·was appropriated, is unconstitutional,. being in violation 
of the due process clause of the Virginia Constitution (Sec-
tion 11) ancl of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of· the United Sta.tes, and ( 4) to remand this cause for 
further proceedings in tho lower Court. 
Counsel for. petitioner desire to state orally the reasons 
for granting the appeal to the decree hereinbefore complained 
of, and tliey will adopt the said petition as their opening brief 
on behalf of the appellant. · 
And as in duty bound, appellant will ever pray, etc. 
BERNARD B. BAILEY, 
Appellant, 
BERNARD R BAILEY, 
RUGH B. MARSH, 
FRANK L. BALL, 
Counsel for Appellant. 
A copv of this petition was mailed to.the appellee's counsel, 
John w: Rust, Fairfax, Virginia, on the 17th day of Febru-
ary, 1943. 
HUGH B. MARSH, 
FRANK L. BALL, 
Of counsel for petitioner. 
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·29e '*We, Hugh B. Marsh and Frank L. Ball, attorneys, at 
law, practicing in the Supreme Court of .Appeals of 
Virginia, do certify that, in our opinion, there is error in the 
decree complained of in the foregoing petition, for which the 
same should be reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals. 
HUGH B. MARSH, 
Address Fairfax, Virginia, 
~ FRANK L. BALL, 
Address Court House Square, Arling'ton, Va. 
Received February 18, 1948. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
March 5, 1943. Appeal awarded by the court. Bond $300. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA.: 
M. B. W. 
Pleas before the Honorable Walter T. McCarthy, Jndg·c 
of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, at a Cir-
cuit Court held for said County, at the Court House there-
of, on Wednesday, the 25th day of November, 1942. 
Bernard B. Bailey, Complainant, 
Vers1ts · 
J . .A. Anderson, State Highway Commissioner, Department 
of Highways, Commonwealth of Virginia, State Office 
Building, Richmond, Virginia, Defendant. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 21st day 
of October, 1941, came the Complainant, bv his Attorney, 
and filed in the Clerk's Office of said Court his Bill of Com-
plaint in the above styled cause, the same being in the words 
and figures following, to-wit: 
page lA ~ In the Circuit Court for Fairfax County~ Virginia. 
Bernard B. Bailey, Complainant, 
Versus 
J. A. Anderson, State Higlnvay Commissioner, Department 
of Highways, Commonwealth of Virginia, State Office 
Building, Richmond, Virginia, Defendant. 
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IN CHANCERY NO. 5762. 
BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
Bernard B. Bailey, a resident of Fairfax County, Virginia, 
complainant, exhibits this, his bill of complaint against J. A. 
Anderson, State Highway Commissioner, Department of 
Highways, Commonwealth of Virginia, State Office Building, 
Richmond, Virginia, defendant, and thereupon states as fol-
lows: 
1. That he is the owner of land in Dranesville Magisterial 
District, Fairfax County, Virginia, between Difficult R,un and 
Browns Chapel on State Highway No. · 7 known as the Alex-
andria-Leesburg Pike. That a, more particular description· 
of said land is contained in the deeds by .which complainant 
obtained title tbei;eto, recorded in the Land Records of Fair-
fax, County, Virginia, in Liber 0, No~ 11, p. 229 and in Liber 
Q. No. 13, P. 316. That on said land is located a. brick grist 
mill built in 1794. That saicl mill is four stories high, and 
contains three pairs of French burr-stones and other equip-
ment commonly used in grist mills. That through said land 
runs a stream of water commonly known as '' Colvin Run,'' 
and from said stream the water :flows through a mill race on 
· said land for a distanc«? o:f approximately one-quar-
page 2- ~ ter of a mile to the said mill, where it is used to 
operate the mill by flowing· over an overshot wooden 
wheel, 20 feet in diameter. That said mill has been operat-
ing continuousl~r except for brief intervals due to drought, 
repairs, sickness, and otl1er unavoidable causes, for nearly a 
centurv and a half, grinding grain for c.ustomei·s for toll as 
required hy the statutes of the State of Virginia., in such 
cases made and provided, and manufacturing· water ground 
corn meal, whole wheat flour, and other· products commonly 
manufactured in water mills, serving the needs of the public 
and enjoying the privileges and water l'ip;hts accorded to it 
under the laws of the State of Virginia. That on account of 
low water due to the present prolong-eel drought the mill is 
not operatinq; continuously but that the mill can and will re-
sume operations when the stream is replenished by rains . 
. 2. That the water flows slowly through said mill raee. That 
for a distance of approximately fifteen hundred feet said 
mill race windH around the foot of a. 8teep hill. That the 
lower side of the race is in tl1e form of a steep bank which 
slopes off onto low land. That sa.icr hill is partly in woods 
and partly in pasture. That on account of the steep eleva-
tion, the tillable land on said hill, if cultivated, washes into 
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the mill race and for that reason the hillside is never 
ploughed. That the leaves and brush from the woods on said 
hill are swept into the mill race by winds and heavy rains. 
3. That at different times during the year and 
page 3 ~ particularly during heavy rains or when the water 
is muddy, large q-qantities of dirt, muck, leaves, 
brush, and sediment are deposited in the mill race, and when 
the high water subsides a deposit of mud and muck remains 
in the race. That when the water· is low, said deposit in the 
race obstructs the flow of the water to said mill wheel and 
causes interruptions in the operation of the mill. That then 
it becomes necessary to clean said mill race by removing the 
mud, mu-ck, leaves, and bru~h, so that the mill may be operated 
without interruption. That the method of cleaning said race 
is to rake the- leaves and brush up onto the bank of the race 
nnd to shovel out the mud onto the race bank. That this has 
always been and is· now the only method of cleaning said mill 
race. That during heavy rain storms when the race is swollen 
with water and when obstacles are washed into the race by 
rain, wind, and water, it becomes necessary to remove such 
obstacles so that the water will not dam up and break through 
tl1e steep l)anks of the race and cause washouts therein. 
4. Oomplainant state~ that said ex~sting Highway No. 7, 
known as the .Alexandria-Leesburg Pike, now runs in front 
of said mill, and tba.t. said highway has in it several curves 
starting near the mill property and extending for a distance 
of approximately one mile ·towards Leesburg. That in said 
distance the existing highway runs in a vertical curve up a 
hill and then m1r-ves on level ground. That in July 
page 4 ~ and August, 1941, the State Highway Department 
had plans to follow generally the center of the ex-
isting hig·hway, except on curves, and the State Highway De-
partment proposed to lighten up the curvature of the exist-
ing highway and to· lower the topography of the hill on the 
ve·rtical curve, and that the State Highwav Department for-
warded said plans for the improvement of the existing road 
to the District Office of the Department at Culpeper, Vir-
_ginia. '.rhat complninant was informed to said plan in July, 
1941, by reading a letter from A. H. Bell, Locating· and Plan-
ning Engineer of the State ·Highway Department, to Hassel 
B. Leig·h, a resident of.Fairfax Countv in· the vicinity of Col-
vin Run, whose address is Vienna, Virginia, R. F. D., and 
complainant believed that said plans would be followed. 
Photostatic copy ·of sa.id letter to said Leigh is attached 
hereto. , 
5. That at the instance and request of persons who own 
property fronting on the existing highway, the agents and 
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engineers of the defendant operating in the District Office of 
the State Highway Department in Culpeper c.aused a survey 
to be made in September 1941 for a re-location of saicl portion 
of the highway on a course running through the mill prop-
erty of complainant behind said grist mill, through said mill 
race, at a point approximately four hundred feet from the 
mill, and cutting· a deep gorge through said hill adjacent to 
the mill race approximately .... feet wide and approximately 
forty feet deep. That complainant is informed and believes 
and so alleges that the plans based on said survey 
page 5 ~ were approved by the Chief Engineer of the State 
Highway Department on September 15, 1941, and 
that said plans call for joints of cement pipe to be set in said 
mill race under the hig·lnvay a.ncl that said pipes are to run 
for a distance of between 90 and 100 feet in said mill race 
and under the said highway, and in a bend corresponding to 
the existing course of the race. 
6. That said plans based on said survey call for the con-
struction of two intersecting· roads on complainant's land 
around said hill adjacent to said mill race and on each side 
of and leading to said proposed hig·hway. That said inter- . 
secting roads are intended not alone for the use of complain-· 
ant but primarily for the use of owners of property adjoin-
ing said mill property. That said adjoining- property owners 
would have an outlet to said proposed highway from their 
own lands but tha.t nevertheless the State Hig·hway Depart-
ment contemplates that said intersecting roads to be con-
strueted on the lands of complainant will be used for the 
benefit and convenience of said adjoining property owners. 
7. That if said l1ighway should be constructed over said 
mill race and cut through said hill in the manner hereinabove 
$et forth the operation of said mill would be seriously and 
materially impaired, if not stopped altogether, because the 
loose earth on the steep banks of the deep cut through the hili 
would wash into the race and, ·with the dirt, muck, mudt..leaves, 
and brush normally deposited in said race, said pipe laid in 
the race under the highway would become elogged 
page 6 ~ and it would be exceedingly difficult if not impos-
~ible to clean said pipe, exceedingly difficult if not 
impossible to maintain a. sufficient flow of water through the 
race to the mill and exceedingly difficult if not impossible to 
operate the mill. That during heavy rain storms when the 
race is swollen with water it would be impossible· to remove 
obstructions from said pipe and the water would back up and 
cut thromrh the ba11k of the mill race and cause washouts 
therein, which would stop the operation of the mill and which 
would be exceedingly expensive and difficult to repair. That 
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said. injuries to the race would be recurring injuries and be-
yond the power of complainant to prevent and would result 
in a complete break-down of the race and a permanent stop-
page of the operation of said mill by water power. · . 
8. That on or about September 14, 1941, A. T. Brownmg, 
Junior Highway Engineer of the State Highway Department 
of Virginia, conferred with complainant about the right-of-
way for the proposed highway back of said mill. That com-
plainant protested and cited the injury that would be done 
to the mill race by the construction of the proposed highway. 
That complainant then endeavored to seek a hearing before 
the State Highway Commission and begun to corifer with all 
the property owners in the community who would be affected 
by the proposed hi~hway back of said mill. That while com-
plainant was endeavoring to reach all parties concerned he 
was approac.hed by said A. T. Browning on September 21 
and was offered a certain sum as damages incident 
page 7 ~ to the construction of said proposed highway. That 
said offer was declined by complainant on said date. 
That thereafter a petition was prepared and signed by the 
complainant and 26 out of 31 property owners a:ff ected by 
such proposed highway and on October 1, · 1941, such petition 
was filed in the office of the defendant in Richmond, Virginia, 
seeking a hearing on the question -of improving the existing 
roadbed without blighting said mill property and other prop-
erties in the neig·hborhood. A photostatic copy of said peti-
tion is attached hereto and expressly made a part hereof. 
9. That on October 6, · 1941, complainant and a group of 
other property owners met with Howard C'. ·Rogers, a. mem-
ber of the State Highway Commission, T. W. Ross, Senior 
Highway .Engineer, and A. T'. Browning, Junior Highway 
Engineer, near the mill property and on the existing road, 
and went over the existing hig·hway and viewed'. and discussed 
the curves thereon and the possibility of improving the high-
way by following the existing course except on curves and by 
lightening up the curvature of the road in accordance with 
the plans contemplated by the State Highway Department 
before the survey back of said mill was made. That complain-
ant and other property owners requested said Highway of-
ficials to make a survey ~nd prepare a plat to sho":_ what 
could be done in lightening up the curvature of the existing 
road. That said T. W. Ross aud A. T. Browning maintained 
that it was useless to make such a survey and stated that it 
was evident without a. survev that said curves in the exist-
ing road could not be lightened up satisfactorily. 
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met with the Chief Engineer and other Highway 
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officials, in Ric.hmond, Virginia, on October 11, 1941, and re-
l)eated the request for a survey and plat to sl1ow what could 
be done to li~hten up the ·curvature on the existing road. That 
complainant explained to said Highway officials the methods 
used in operating said grist mill and stated to them that the 
construction of the proposed road through the mill race and 
through the hill adjoining the mill race would materially and 
seriously impair if not stop altogether the operation of said 
mill for the reasons herein above stated. That complainant 
stated to said Highway officials that it would be unlawful to 
so impair or stop the operation of the mills by the construc-
tion of the proposed road and that it would be unlawful to 
construct roads across the land of complainant for the use, 
benefit, and convenience of the adjoining property owners 
who would already have access to the proposed road from 
their own property. That said officials refused to grant such 
·request and treated lightly the contentions of the complain-
ant in regard to the operation of said mill. That complainant 
then requested a. conference with Counsel for the State High-
way Commission and requested that the construction of said 
proposed road be postponed until the legal questions could 
be reviewed by Counsel for Hip;hwa;y Department. That the 
Chief Engineer of the State Highway Department stated to 
complainant at said meeting· that the construction 
page 9 } of said proposed road would not be commenced 
until right~-of-way were obtained. 
11. TJhat on the afternoon of the sHme day; to-wit Satur-
day, Oc.tober 11, 1941, complainant and other property own-
ers endeavored to confer with .John vV. Rust, Esq., local 
Counsel for the State Highway Department at Fairfax, Vir-
gfoia, and being· unable to see him a.t that time, went to his 
office on Monday, October 13, 1941, ancl after discussing· the 
legal questions with him, and the effect of the proposed high-
wav on the operation of said mill, complainant again re-
Qnested tlrnt a survey' of the existing road be made, or tha.t 
. in any event the construction of the proposed road through 
con111lainant 's property be postponed until the complainant 
could have time to prepare for a suit to enjoin said construc-
tion. 
12. That on the same date, to-wit, on Monday, October i3, 
1941, complainant received a letter from the State Highway 
Department, dated October 11, 1941, which was the date of 
said meeting· in Richmond, Virginia. That in said letter it 
w3:s stated that a certificate of deposit was being· filed with 
the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County for the com-
plainant's benefit in order tl1at work might proceed in the 
construction of the hfo;hway through complainant's property. 
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Said letter is filed herewith and expressly made a part hereof 
said procedure being· had under Chapter 83 of the 1940 sup-
plement to Michie 's Code of the State of Virg,inia. See Sec-
. · tion 1969j(6). That said sectio1i and also section 
page 10 ~ 1969j ( 4) of said 1940 Supplement are unconstitu-
.. tional in that the condemnation proceeding- may 
be postponed for an unreasonable length of, time, to-wit, sixty 
days after the ·Completion of the construction of th«:: high: 
way. 
13. Tba t on· October 14, 194.1, and ag·ain on October 15, 
1941, said T. W. Ross, Senior Highway Engineer of the iState 
Highway Department, was requested to hold up the construc-
tion for at least a few days until complainant could consult 
Counsel for the purposes of·bringing· suit to enjoin such con-
struction. That said request was refused and that on Octo-
·ber 15, 1941, a steam shovel, machines, trucks, and! equipment 
of the State Highway Department were moved into the com:. 
plainant 's property. That on October 16, 1941, the exeava-
, tion through said hill and mill race was commenced and is now 
going on. That an immense quantity of dirt has been dug· out 
of. said hill already in a few days' time, and pipes and dirt have 
been placed in said mill race, and that if said construction 
is continued at the present rate a deep cut or gorge through 
said bill will be cut before the complainant is able to have 
a hearing in court, causing irreparable damage to the com-
plainant. That complainant is unable financially to furnish 
an adequate bond so as to obtain a temporary order enjoin-
ing said, excavation and that complainant is without adequate 
·remedy at law. That complainant is unable to estimate the 
amount of the damage that will be done to his property by 
said construction be~use it is impossible to determine how 
far the defendant will proceed before the matter 
pa~e 11 ~ is determined b:y the court. · . 
14. Tfuat an acceptable highway, suitable for 
modern, heavy through traffic, can be-constructed by follow-
ing- generally the center of the existing highway in front of. 
said mill and by lightening up the curvature of the existing 
hig·hway and lowering· the topogTaphy on the vertical curve. 
That said improvement of the existing road would not inter-
fere with the operation of said mill and that the cost and 
maintenance would be no more and probably would be much 
less than the proposed highway through said mill race. That 
although requested to do so, the engineers of the State High-
way Department have refused to make a plat showing a re-
construction of the existing road, but that a plat showing the 
possibility of constru.cting an acceptable highway on the ex-
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isting road has been .made by Joseph Berry, County Sur-
veyor of Fairfax County, since October 13, 1941, which is 
dated and filed herewith and expressly made a part hereof. 
15. Complainant avers and c.harges that the construction 
of said hig·hway through said mill race in the manner herein-
above set forth is unlawful in that the defendant will stop 
.or materially impair the operation of complainant's gTisi 
mill which is devoted to a public use and the defendant is not 
expressly authorized by statute to do so and the defendant 
is not authorized by necessary implication from the stat-ute 
to do so, inasmuch as an acceptable highway, suitable for 
modern, heavy throng·h traffic can be constructed 
page 12 ~ on the existing highway without interfering with 
the operation of said gTist mill and at a cost no 
-g·reater than the cost of the proposed highway through said 
mill race. That the construction of said intersecting roads 
to the proposed highway over the lands of the complainant 
is unlawful in that said roads are intended primarily for the 
use of adjoining landowners who would have an outlet to said 
proposed highway from their own lands. 
Complainant avers and c.harges that he is without a plain, 
nnd adequate remedy at law. 
In view of the premises, complainant prays that he may · 
be allowed to file this, his suit; that proper process may is-
sue herein against the defendant; that complainant may be 
awarded a permanent injunction enjoining and restraining 
the defendant from the unlawful construction of said high-
way o-ver the land and through the mill race of the complain-
ant and damages caused by the excavations, fills, and other 
nnl:nvful acts of the defendant in constructing said highway, 
the extent of which cannot be presently ascertained; that com-
plainant may be awarded a mandatory injunction requiring 
the defendant to restore the complainant's land as far as 
possible to the condition existing before said unlawful con-
struction was commenced; that all necessary orders and de-
crees may be had and entered herein; that the said statute 
aforesaid be declai:ed unconstitutional because the time pro-
vided for in said section is unreasonable and there-
page l3 ~ fore allows the taking of private property with-
out due process of law; and that complainant may 
l1ave all such other~ further, and complete relief as the na-
ture of his case may require and as to equity may seem meet. 
And to this end complainant prays tlmt ,J. A. Anderson, 
State Highway Commissioner, Department of Highways, 
Commonwealth of Vir!?;'inia, State Office Building; .Richmond, 
Virginia, may be made party defendant hereto and be re-
,. 
•; 
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quired to answer the alle&9a tions he~eof, answer under oath 
being hereby expressly waived. 
And as in duty bound, complainant will ever pray, etc. 
(Signed) BERNARD B. BAILEY 
Complainant 
(Signed) HUGH B. MARSH 
(Signed) FRANK! L. BALL 
Counsel for c.omplainant 
page 14 } State of Virginia, 
· County of Fairfax, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, Ruth A. Mitchell, 
a notary public in and for the State and County aforesaid 
and whose commission as such will expire on the second day 
of February, 1942, Bernard B. Bailey, the complaina.nt in 
the f oreg·oing and hereunto annexed bill of complaint and who 
then and there was first duly sworn and who thereupon made 
oath and affidavit before me that he is the complainant in 
the foregoing and hereunto annexed bill of complaint and 
that he has read the allegations contained in the said bill of 
complaint and that the facts and allegations therein set forth, 
are true an~ correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
Given under my hand this 21st day of Oetober, 1941. 
RUTH A. MITCHELL 
Notary Pub Ii~ as afore said. 
page 15 ~ In the Circuit Court. of F 1airfax County, Virginia. 
Bernard B. Bailey, Complainant, 
'V, 
J. A. Anderson, State Highway Commissioner, Department 
of Hig·hways, Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendant. 
CH;ANCERY NO. 5762. 
DEUURRER. 
The defendant, J. A. A·nclerson, State Highway Commis-
sioner, files this his demurrer· to the bill filed in the above en-
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titled ca:use, and says that the bill filed in this cause is not 
sufficient in law, and states the follo,,.,.ing grounds of de-
murrer: 
t That there is no statute or other law existing in Vir-
g'inia which prohibits the State Highway Commissioner from 
condemning; for big·bway purposes property used for milling, 
and that the State Highway Commissioner under the laws 
of the State of Virginia has full power to proceed with the 
construction of the highway through the said property of 
complainant, and the bill alleges that the mill had not been 
in operation for some time and is not now being operated 
by the complainant, and is not the ref ore a going concern. 
2. Tha.t section 1969'j of the 1936 Code of Virginia, and the 
.acts amendatory thereto delegates to the State Highway Com-
mi~sion<:r the power to determine, without judicial review, 
the necessity or expediency of the location of all highways 
under its dominion, and the location of the highway in ques-
tion and the necessitv therefor are solelv in the 
page 16 r discretion of the State Highway Commissioner, as 
tllis is a leg·islative question, and a hearing thereon 
is not essential to due process in the case under the 14th 
Amendment. 
3. That there is no question as to· the constitutionality of 
the Virg;inia Statutes in reference to the location, necessity 
and procedure in tl1e establishing of the hig·hways in Virginia, 
as the statutes provide full and just compensation for the 
land taken, and clue proc.ess of law as applied to judicial pro-
ceedings instituted _for the taking of private property for 
public use means sueh process ns recognizes the right of the 
owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from him 
and transferred to the publie, and that the Virginia Legisla-
ture ]ms full power to enact lmvs except so far as restrained 
by the Constitution, and that there is a positive presumption 
of the constitutionality of all laws, and that every fair doubt 
must be resolved in favor of the c.onstitutionalitv of the acts 
of the General Assembly. and that the legislature has the 
rig·ht to presc.ribe the form and procedure to be observed in 
'th·e taking of private property for highway purposes; and 
tllat the complainant in clutllenging the constitutionality of 
the statute must clearly show that in its operation it is un-
constitutional as to J1is situation and that he has been injured 
by its provisions, and this is not shown by the allegations of 
the bill. 
4. Tlrnt. there are no allegations in the bill justifying the 
Court in awarding a permanent injunction enjoining and re-
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straining the State Highway Commissioner from 
page 17 } constructing said highway, under the Virginia 
statutes. 
(Signed) JOHN "\V. RUST 
Attorney for Defendant. 
page 18 } In the Circuit Court for Fairfax County, Virginia. 
Bernard B. Bailey, Complainant, 
v. 
J. A. Anderson, iState Highway Commissfoner, Department 
of Highways, Commonwealth of Virginia, State Office. 
Building, Richmond, Virginia, Defendant. 
IN PHANCERY #5762. 
FINAL DECREE. 
NOVEM·BER TERM, 1942. 
I 
This cause came on this 25th day of November, 1942, to 
be heard upon the bill of complaint and exhibits therewith 
filed, upon the process · duly issued with the return thereon 
endorsed showing that service of the same was duly and 
regularly had on the defendant; upon the demurrer filed 
herein by the defendant and it appearing to the court that 
complainant has proceeded regularly at rules and has prop-
erly matured thi$ cause against the defendant and that said 
cause is properly on the active docket of this court and is 
readv for hearing. ,. 
Whereupon, this cause is now lrnard upon the orig·inal bill 
and the demurrer filed herein by the defendant, and upon ar-
~ument of counsel, the court being of the opinion that the 
demurrer is well taken, the court cloth adjudge, order and 
decree that the demurrer be and the same now hereby is sus-
tained, ttnd this cause! be and the same now berebv is stricken 
from the docket and this decree is final, and thereupon the 
. complainant excepted to the ruling of the court in sustaining 
the said demurrer. 
pag·e 19 } And the complainnnt having shmified his inten-
tion of applying- to the Rnpr(lme Court of Appeals 
of this State for an apneal from this final decree, tl1e court 
doth further order, adjudge ancl deeree that the operation 
of this final decree is snsocndecl for a period of 90 days from 
this date, and the complainant, is g-rantecl.a period of 15 days 
from the date of the entry of thh:: decree within whic]1 period 
the complainant is to enter into an appeal bond in the penalty 
Be!nard B. Bailey v. J. A . .Anderson, State Hwy. Com. 31 
of $500.00, conditioned as the law directs, in accordance with 
the statutes in such cases made and provided. 
And this decree is final. 
Enter: 
WALTER T. McCARTHY 
Judge. 
Seen: 
(Sig·ned) ,TORN W. RUST 
Counsel for J. A. Anderson, Etc., 
Defendant . 
. (Signed) FRANK L. BALL, by H. B. M. 
HUGH B. MARSH 
Counsel for Bernard B. Bailey, 
Complainant. 
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To .John M. Whalen, Esquire, 
Clerk of tbe Circuit Court for 
Fairfax County, State of Va., 
Fairfax, Virginia 
Dear Mr. Whalen: 
January 2, 1943 
It is stipula.ted and agreed by and· between counsel for 
complainant and counsel for the defendant, in the chancery 
cause of Bernard B. Bailey, Complainant, v. J. A .. .Anderson, 
State Highway Commissioner, Department of Highways, 
Commonwealth of Virginia, State Office Building, Richmond, 
Virginia, Defendant, Chancery No. 5762, that the record in 
said cause for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of the State of Virginia, shall consist of the Bill of Complaint, 
the Demurrer filed in said ca.use by tl1e defendant and thP. 
Final Decree entered in said cause by the Court. 
Very truly yours, 
JOHN V/. RUST (Signed) 
Counsel for J. A. Anderson, etc., 
Defendant 
FRANKL. BALL (Signed) 
HUGH B. MARSH (Signed) 
Counsel for Bernard B. ·Bailey, 
Complainant 
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page 21 ~ CLERK'S CERTIFICAT;E. 
I, John l\L Whalen, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County, Virginia, do hereby certify. that the following is a 
true transcript of those portions of the record stipulated and 
agreed upon by the counsel for the Complainant and Defend-
ant in the cause lately pending in said Court under the style 
of Bernard B. Bailey, Complainant, versus .J. A. Anderson, 
State Highway Commissioner, Department of Highways, 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, Defendant, 
as shown, Chancery No. 5850, by the stipulation filed in the 
papers of said cause. 
I further certify that the notice required by Section 6339 
of the Code of Virginia was duly given by the Complainant 
to the Defendant, and service thereof duly had upon counsel 
for the Defendant. · 
Given under my hand this 4th day of February, 1943. 
(Seal) 
A Copy-Teste : 
JOHN M. WHALEN, 
Clerk. 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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